I bought Harpoon 3 Advanced Naval Warfare yesterday and of course I could not resist the urge to play it immediatly. I selected a scenario at random and ended up in “Three young tigers” commanding some Philippino/Malay/American coalition going up against the PLAN in the usual disagreement over the Spratlys.

Installation was fast and trivial but my immediate impression was one of disappointement. The graphical interface is still its more than a decade old Harpoon II self with its windowing system independant from Windows own and limited to a window (no full screen) with a maximum size of 1280×1024 pixels. As promised it is rock stable – no crash, no glitch and no problems whatsoever switching between H3ANW and other applications. But I expected some ergonomics improvements and there are none. Interaction with the game is still as clunky as ever and the concept of contextual menu and drag’n'drop are still unknown in the Harpoon world.

On top of all that, even on an Athlon 2400, H3ANW is still the CPU hog that Harpoon has always been – I pegged CPU usage to 100% during the whole game. And I do not yet understand what the increased CPU usage brings : I have not found the AI to have improved measurably.

So to me, H3ANW is a stable bug-free Harpoon II with multiplayer capability. Not bad if only for the sheer nostalgia value. I do not regret my purchase and I will surely find much pleasure in toying with imaginary haze gray heavy metal, especially if I can find a like-minded friend to play with. But I do not believe that H3ANW will appeal to anyone outside of a small circle of old Harpoon players and hard-core naval warfare afficionados. That traditionnal audience will find just what it needed, but the casual gamers who overcame the initial hurdle of getting interested to a realistic simulation with historic context and getting used to the NTDS symbols will certainly be horrified by the woeful ergonomics.

Ever since I started playing Harpoon II eleven years ago I longed for human opponents. Multiplayer developments of Harpoon have long been promised but various projects encountered endless corporate obstacles and left the fans frustrated. But today the wait has ended : Harpoon 3 Advanced Naval Warfare has been released with multiplayer support. As Harpoon is by very far the best commercially available naval combat simulator, the perspective of playing against my fellow humans fills me with joy. Now I have to convince some of them to join me… Meanwhile you can read a good article about H3ANW by Armchair General (from which the following screenshot has been taken) with enough background information to put you up to speed with what to expect from Harpoon.

In an article dated from wednesday the 7th of June 2006, Strategypage claims “Zarqawi Scheduled for Martyrdom” and goes on explaining how strained relationships with the mainline al Qaeda leadership makes his fall at the hands of his partners a likely event.

In an article dated from thuesday the 8th of June 2006 at 8:42am ETReuters announces “Al Qaeda’s Zarqawi killed“. Associated Press goes on precising that “Al-Zarqawi and several aides [..] were killed Wednesday evening“.

It appears that Strategypage has hinted at Zarqawi’s death before the official announcement. Is that just a coincidence and good foresight by Strategypage ? Strategypage having very good relationships with members of US military and paramilitary forces, I would rather think the information was leaked to them before an official press release.

“War upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife” – TE Lawrence.

In his book “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife” John Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. Like “The Seven Pillars of Wisdom” from which TE Lawrence’s quote is excerpted, it is a very useful read for understanding the current situation in Iraq. Written well before Operation Iraqi Freedom it nethertheless shows lessons very relevant to it.

Voicing publicly the private views of many of his peers, Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, a senior officer in the British Army has published a critical analysis of American military attitudes in Iraq. I do not believe his paper to be the scathing account that the press presents. On the contrary, it confirms the traditional strengths of the US Army and the ability for learning that individuals have demonstrated. But is does point out how heavy institutional inertia prevents widespread adaptation to the nature of counterinsurgency. Compounded doctrinal and cultural factors are shown to be the root cause of the American difficulties in Iraq.

Alwyn-Foster cites Nagl noting that “The American Army’s role from its very origins was the eradication of threats to national survival’, in contrast to the British Army’s history as ‘an instrument of limited war, designed to achieve limited goals at limited cost”. The USA possesses nearly irresistible powers in conventional wars against nation-states. But when confronted with counterinsurgency operations, this strength induces such a bias that it becomes a root of weakness : when the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. For example, Alwyn-Foster underlines that the US Army’s ‘Soldier’s creed’ “enjoins the soldier to have just the one type of interaction with his enemy – ‘to engage and destroy him:’ not defeat, which could permit a number of other politically attuned options, but destroy”. Being a warrior is part, but not all, of being a soldier.

Alwyn-Foster’s paper leads the reader to “the realisation that all military activity is subordinate to political intent, and must be attuned accordingly: mere destruction of the enemy is not the answer”. It is no suprise to me that he reminds me of what my aikido master used to teach us : the goal of martial arts is not the destruction of the opponent, it is the destruction of the conflict. Adversary and partner are one and there can be no winning of the hearts and minds unless this has been realized.